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Abstract
We discuss a principal-agent model in which the principal has the
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1 Introduction
In July 2005, Google announced the opening of a research and development
center in China. The center was to be headed by Dr. Kai-Fu Lee, a renowned
well connected computer scientist working for Microsoft in China and re-
portedly Microsofts face in China. Dr. Lee was appointed as President
of Google China. But as Microsoft revealed shortly afterwards, Dr. Lee was
subject to a non-compete agreement with Microsoft. In 2000 he had signed an
agreement providing that, for a period of one year after leaving Microsoft, he
would not accept employment or engage in activities competitive with prod-
ucts, services or projects ... on which [he] worked or about which [he] learned
condential or proprietary information or trade secrets while employed at
Microsoft.
Microsoft feared that Dr. Lee would use information he had obtained
while working for Microsoft to its competitor Googles advantage. The com-
pany immediately went to court in Seattle, Washington. The court issued
a restraining order, temporarily forbidding Dr. Lee to work on projects for
Google similar to those he performed for Microsoft which included work on
search engines and the development of business strategies for the Chinese
market.1
Hence, non-compete agreements seem to be a very powerful instrument
to protect a rms internal knowledge when this knowledge creates a compet-
itive advantage. Not only in the technology industry loosing an employee to
a competitor may have harmful consequences for a rm. Insurance compa-
nies, investment banks and lawyers for instance might want to prohibit their
employees to be hired by a competitor as those employees might try to take
specic clients with them. In addition, such an agreement may also prevent
that the employee himself directly turns into a competitor by becoming self-
employed. Therefore, a puzzling question remains: why do we not observe a
non-compete agreement in all existing employment contracts?
In this paper, we want to investigate reasons for a rm not to use such
an agreement in an employment contract. A rst possible reason may be
1Description based on Baker & Hostetler LLP Executive Alert, September 2005.
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given by legal problems to enforce such agreements. For instance, in the
US the possibilities to enforce a non-compete agreement di¤er between the
federal states. In the above mentioned case, Google itself led a separate
suit against Microsoft at a Californian court claiming that the agreement was
unenforceable under Californian law. Indeed Californian courts are claimed
to be much less likely to enforce a non-compete agreement.2 However, this
was turned down as Dr. Lees contract provided that possible litigation had
to be in Washington state.
In this paper, we show that based on incentive considerations an em-
ployer may not want to impose such a contractual provision. As we will
show, this reason may lead a rm to forgo the possibility to impose a non-
compete agreement even if the expected future loss to itself is larger than
the expected future gain to the employee when leaving. To understand the
basic idea note the following: It is often quite hard for rms to measure the
specic performance of individual employees objectively. Hence, rms must
often rely on indirect measures to reward performance such as for instance
the number of patents granted for researchers or the turnover in a certain
area for sales persons. Such measures are often noisy or measure only the
performance of a whole team of agents. The literature on incentive contracts
contains numerous examples showing that this typically leads to costly and
ine¢ ciently low powered incentive schemes. Even if the rm is able to observe
individual performance, there is the problem to give a credible commitment
to honor exceptional performance when it is unveriable in court.
But note that the fact that an employee gets an attractive job o¤er may
in itself be a signal that he has built some form of valuable human capital.
Moreover, this will be a signal on his individual performance. Imposing a
non-compete agreement will not prohibit that such a signal occurs. Even
when he has signed such an agreement the employee can come up with exter-
nal o¤ers when he successfully built valuable human capital. But with such
an agreement the rm has an incentive ex-post to deny the agents success.
However, when not imposing the agreement the rm can still convince the
employee ex-post to stay but it has to raise the employees wage. Therefore,
2See Gilson (1999).
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forgoing such an agreement can be a device for the principal to commit cred-
ibly to honor high performance in the future. This creates implicit incentives
for the agent in addition to explicit incentives generated by bonus payments
based on objective measures.
Instead of strict non-compete agreements, the employer may use contrac-
tual arrangements that are less problematic to be enforced by law. In prac-
tice, courts seem to nd it di¢ cult to verify that the non-compete agreement
is reasonable for protecting the employers legitimate interests. However,
courts are more prone to enforce contractual solutions where an employee
voluntarily decides not to become a competitor and receives a predetermined
amount of money as compensation from the employer. In Section 5, we there-
fore investigate the optimal use of such option contracts. We also analyze
a related solution in which the employee has to pay a ne to the employer
when leaving the rm. We show that option and ne contracts are superior
to a strict non-compete agreement as they allow the employer to ne-tune in-
centives. Indeed, similar contractual solutions can be found in practice. The
rst one is called forfeiture-for-competition clause.3 Here, post-employment
benets are linked to the employees subsequent career. If he becomes a di-
rect competitor of his former employer or accepts a position at a rival rm,
the employee will forfeit the post-employment benets. The second alterna-
tive are garden leave provisions developed in England and Wales and now
widely used also in the US:4 Employees receive their full salary but have to
remain inactive in the labor market by staying at home.
The paper is related to other elds in the existing literature. First, there
are parallels to the literature on explicit versus implicit incentives (e.g. Baker,
Gibbons and Murphy 1994, 2002, Schmidt and Schnitzer 1995). However,
that literature typically discusses the interplay of informal agreements and
formal contracts within a repeated-game setting. In our paper, the princi-
pal can either permit implicit incentives by not imposing a non-competition
clause or she can prohibit implicit incentives by using such a clause. There is
also a connection to the career concerns literature where implicit incentives
3See, for example, Starr and Strauss (2004).
4See e.g. Lembrich (2002).
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are generated by an agents career prospects (Holmström 1982, Gibbons and
Murphy 1992).
Moreover, there exists a related literature on labor mobility as a source of
technology spillovers which discusses organizational solutions for preventing
knowledge transfer (e.g. Pakes and Nitzan 1983, Ronde 2001, Rajan and
Zingales 2001, Kräkel 2005). Possible solutions are the division of labor into
di¤erent tasks, the optimal design of the hierarchical structure or simply
withholding of knowledge by the principal. This paper concentrates on non-
compete agreements as an alternative solution which has not been addressed
in this context.
Furthermore, there are papers that directly deal with non-compete agree-
ments and other instruments to limit the agents contractual freedom. Fosfuri
and Ronde (2004) and Hellmann and Perotti (2005) discuss non-compete
agreements in the context of knowledge spillovers. Whereas Fosfuri and
Ronde consider the impact of such agreements on rmsincentives to cluster,
Hellmann and Perotti show that allowing the agent to leave the rm reduces
the principals labor costs. Feess and Muehlheusser (2005) analyze the im-
plications of di¤erent contract lengths for players in football teams. In their
model, shorter contracts increase the players incentives since they open the
opportunity for renegotiation after some successful matches.
Finally, the ndings of our paper can be interpreted in the context of
the incomplete contract literature (e.g. Grossman and Hart 1986, Hart and
Moore 1990). In those models, the transfer of ownership increases an agents
outside option and therefore generates incentives. In a sense, the omission
of a non-compete clause in our model can be interpreted as giving the agent
stronger ownership rights in his own human capital and this makes him work
harder.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the model is
introduced. Section 3 considers a situation without incentive problems. The
optimality of a non-competition clause in the presence of incentive problems
is analyzed in Section 4. Section 5 introduces the possibility of a fee which
the agent has to pay to the principal in case of leaving the rm. Section 6
concludes.
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2 The Model
A rm represented by a principal P hires an agent A. Both players are risk
neutral. The agent can exert an e¤ort a to create an innovation. He is either
successful (IA = 1) or not (IA = 0) and a is the probability that the agent
is successful in creating the innovation (i.e. prob{IA = 1}= a). His costs
of e¤ort are c (a) where c (a) is monotonically increasing and strictly convex
with c00 (a) > 0, c000 (a)  0, c (0) = 0, c0 (0) = 0, and lima!1 c0 (a) =1. The
innovation will allow the rm to enter a new market. Not only agent A works
on the innovation. Even when he fails, the principal makes the innovation
(IP = 1) with a given probability prob{IP = 1}= p. With probability
prob{IP = 0}= 1   p the principal is not successful. Then principal and
agent learn whether the innovation is made (maxfIA; IPg = 1). The event of
an innovation is veriable but not the identity of the innovator.5 Hence, an
incentive contract for the agent can only be conditional on the fact that an
innovation has been made. The optimal bonus contract therefore consists of
a base wage w and a bonus b paid to the agent in case of an innovation. We
assume that the agent is protected by limited liability such that w  0 and
w + b  0 and has a reservation wage of 0.
If an innovation has been made, the principal can enter the new market.
But at the same point the agent may quit the rm. We assume that the agent
will have built up industry specic human capital if he himself discovered the
innovation (IA = 1). Hence, he may be hired by a competitor or set up his
own rm and compete with his former employer. We assume that such an
opportunity arises with probability z once the agent himself has discovered
the innovation. If the innovation has been made but the agent does not
become a competitor of the principal, the latter will earn prots M > 0.
When the agent becomes a competitor the principals prots are reduced to
DP < M .6 In this case, the agent himself will earn DA > 0. We assume
5Note that, in practice, individual performance often is not veriable. However, the
more aggregate a performance measure is, the more likely it will be veriable by a third
party. At least, at the highest level of aggregation at rm level there exists a veriable
performance measure: rm prots. Of course, the higher the level of aggregation the less
accrurate the measure will be in describing individual success.
6Note that if the agent has made the innovation and leaves the rm, the principal will
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that it is veriable whether the agent separates from the principal. However,
it is not veriable whether the agent can indeed earn DA when leaving the
rm. We can think of a situation, in which the principal is a monopolist
when the agent does not separate from her, but becomes a duopolist in
case of separation. However, the following results do neither need explicit
assumptions on the number of competitors in the market nor on the form of
competition.
The principal has the possibility to impose a non-compete agreement
in the initial contract. Such a clause will forbid the agent to become the
principals competitor. Formally, besides the base wage and the bonus, the
contract o¤er contains a supplement s which can either be s = C if a non-
competition clause is added or s = NC if no clause is chosen by the principal.
Our key objective is to investigate whether she will want to impose a non-
competition clause or not. We restrict the analysis to the case of M 
DA +DP . If this condition does not hold it will always be optimal that the
agent leaves the rm after an innovation.
Note that of course when the principal does not choose s = C ex-ante she
may well try to prevent that the agent enters the market ex-post by making
a retention o¤er. We assume that the principal has all the bargaining power
and makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er at each stage.
still be able to enter the new market since the prototype of the innovation belongs to the
rm.
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The time-schedule of the game is as follows.
1 2 3 4 5
-
P o¤ers con- A chooses A and P If IA = 1 P makes
tract (w; b; s) ; e¤ort observe and s = NC retention
A decides level a IA and IP A may sepa- o¤er;
on acceptance rate with payments
probability z
First, the principal o¤ers a contract (w; b; s) to the agent who then has
to accept or reject the o¤er. When accepting, the agent chooses e¤ort a.
Thereafter, both principal and agent observe individual success or failure
in discovering the innovation. If the agent has been successful and no non-
compete agreement has been chosen, with probability z the agent will get the
opportunity to separate from the principal. In this case, the principal can
o¤er a lump-sum payment to make the agent stay. Finally, all contractual
payments are made.
3 No Incentive Problem
As a reference case we rst consider the scenario where the agents e¤ort level
can be specied in the contract and, hence, no bonus is needed to generate
incentives. Still the principal may either impose a non-competition clause or
she may not. First, we investigate the case where such clause is chosen. The
agents participation constraint requires w   c (a)  0. In optimum, it will
be binding and the principal solves
max
a
(p+ a (1  p))M   c (a) :
The rst-order condition is (1  p)M = c0 (a) and the rst-best e¤ort level
is therefore given by
aFB = A ((1  p)M) (1)
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where A (x) = c0 1 (x). The principals net prots are
 
p+ aFB (1  p)M  
c
 
aFB

.
Now we consider the case s = NC where no non-competition clause is
imposed. Because ofM  DA+DP the principal will always make a retention
o¤er when the agent gets the opportunity to become self-employed or an
employee of a competing rm. As the principal has all the bargaining power
she will pay an amount of DA to the agent. His participation constraint is
therefore
w   c (a) + azDA  0: (2)
If the participation constraint is binding the principal will be indi¤erent
between s = C and s = NC as the only e¤ect of the clause is that an
amount of azDA is paid to the agent in form of a higher wage w rather than
as the expected outcome of the renegotiation when the agent gets the chance
to leave. But if the participation constraint is not binding the optimal wage
w will be equal to zero and the principal is clearly worse o¤ without the
clause as she pays too much to the agent.
Hence, the principal will always be at least weakly better o¤ with a non-
compete agreement so that it is optimal for her to impose such a clause when
there is no incentive problem. We now check whether the optimality of a non-
compete agreement will still hold if the principal has to motivate the agent
to work hard by using a performance contingent contract.
4 The Provision of Incentives
4.1 Optimal Contract with a Non-Compete Agreement
Now a is no longer veriable and the principal can pay a bonus b in case
of an innovation. First, consider the case where a non-competition clause is
imposed. For a given contract (w; b; C) the agent maximizes his expected
utility
w + (p+ a (1  p)) b  c (a) :
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The rst-order condition (1  p) b = c0 (a) yields the incentive constraint
a = A ((1  p) b) (3)
where again A (x) = c0 1 (x). The limited liability constraint requires that
w; w+ b  0. Hence, the agents utility is always non-negative and therefore
the participation constraint is implied by the limited liability constraint. It
is straightforward to see that any optimal contract will have a zero base wage
w. Hence, the principal solves
max
b
(p+ A ((1  p) b) (1  p)) (M   b) :
We obtain the following result:
Proposition 1 When imposing a non-compete agreement in the contract the
principal will provide incentives to the agent by paying a bonus in case of an
innovation if M is strictly larger than a cut-o¤ value MC =
p
A0(0)(1 p)2 . In
that case, the bonus payment is characterized by
bC =M   p+ A ((1  p) bC) (1  p)
A0 ((1  p) bC) (1  p)2
: (4)
The implemented e¤ort level will be smaller than the rst-best e¤ort level.
Proof:
The rst derivative of the principals objective function with respect to b is
A0 ((1  p) b) (1  p)2 (M   b)  (p+ A ((1  p) b) (1  p))
The principal will impose a positive bonus and we will have an interior so-
lution if and only if this expression is strictly positive at b = 0 which is the
case when M > p=
 
A0 (0) (1  p)2. In that case we can solve the rst-order
condition for b and obtain expression (4).7 By inserting this expression into
7Substituting for b in the second-order condition according to (4) yields that all sta-
tionary points are local maxima. However, for more than one maximum we must have at
least one local minimum which contradicts the nding before. Hence, (4) describes the
global maximum.
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(3) it can directly be seen that the chosen e¤ort level is smaller than the
rst-best e¤ort level.
Due to the agents limited liability, setting incentives is always costly since
the agent earns a rent. As the identity of the innovator is unveriable the
agent would earn a bonus with probability p even when exerting no e¤ort at
all which aggravates the problem and raises the costs of inducing incentives.
Therefore, the principal will only provide incentives ifM is su¢ ciently large.
Furthermore, note that the cut-o¤ MC is monotonically increasing in p.
This has two reasons. First, for higher values of p the principal is less depen-
dent on the agent to create the innovation and, hence, providing incentives
to the agent is less important. But in addition, higher values of p lead to
stronger free riding by the agent (see (3)) and this makes setting incentives
more costly.
4.2 Optimal Contract when the Agent may Quit
We start by investigating the point in the time-schedule where the agent
may get the chance to leave the rm given s = NC. If the agent does not
have the opportunity to work for a competitor or to become self-employed
the game of course ends. But when he gets this opportunity after coming up
with the innovation the principal can decide whether to keep him. Note that
in this case the principal will always be better o¤ when retaining the agent.
As she has all the bargaining power she will pay a lump-sum of DA to the
agent and her prots are reduced to M   b   DA when the agent gets the
opportunity to quit which is the case with probability az. The principals
expected prots are (p+ a (1  p)) (M   b) azDA and the agents objective
function is given by
(p+ a (1  p)) b+ azDA   c (a) :
The rst-order condition
(1  p) b+ zDA = c0 (a) (5)
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yields
a = A ((1  p) b+ zDA) : (6)
It is straightforward to see from a comparison of (3) and (6) that for a
given bonus payment the agent now works harder. Making the innovation
becomes more attractive as it may open up the opportunity for the agent
to get attractive outside o¤ers or to set up his own rm. But of course the
principal also looses as her prots are reduced when the agent may threaten
to quit. Again w = 0 and the participation constraint will always be satised.
Given s = NC the principal therefore solves
max
b
(p+ A ((1  p) b+ zDA) (1  p)) (M   b)  A ((1  p) b+ zDA) zDA:
We obtain the following result:
Proposition 2 When not imposing a non-compete agreement in the contract
the principal will provide explicit incentives to the agent by paying a bonus
in case of an innovation if M is strictly larger than a cut-o¤ value MNC =
zDA
1 p +
p+A(zDA)(1 p)
A0(zDA)(1 p)2 . This cut-o¤ exceeds the cut-o¤
MC when the clause is
imposed. The bonus payment is characterized by
bNC =M   1
1  p

p+ A ((1  p) bNC + zDA) (1  p)
A0 ((1  p) bNC + zDA) (1  p) + zDA

: (7)
The optimal bonus is smaller than the bonus with a non-compete agreement.
Proof:
The rst derivative of the principals objective function is
A0 ((1  p) b+ zDA) (1  p) [(1  p) (M   b)  zDA] (8)
  (p+ A ((1  p) b+ zDA) (1  p)) :
The principal will impose a positive bonus and we will have an interior so-
lution if and only if this expression is strictly positive at b = 0 which is the
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case if
A0 (zDA) (1  p)2M   (p+ A (zDA) (1  p))  A0 (zDA) (1  p) zDA > 0
,M > p+ A (zDA) (1  p)
A0 (zDA) (1  p)2
+
zDA
1  p:
As c000 (a)  0 we have A00 (x)  0 and the cut-o¤ value is strictly increasing
in z. Therefore MNC > MC for z > 0. In that case, we can solve (8) for
b and obtain expression (7).8 Note that this is equal to (4) if z = 0. By
implicit di¤erentiation of the rst-order condition (8) we obtain
@b
@z
=   DA
1  p < 0: (9)
The results from Propositions 1 and 2 are illustrated in Figure 1. The
dashed line is MC : when a non-compete agreement is imposed the principal
pays a bonus only if his revenue from a successful innovation is larger than
MC . The solid line depicts MNC as a function of z. Without the clause, the
principals decision on whether to pay a bonus depends on z which determines
the agents income when coming up with the innovation. The higher the
probability that the agent gets an opportunity to become (or work for) a
competitor the higher are his incentives to come up with an innovation.
Hence, larger values of z reduce the necessity to induce incentives through
an explicit bonus.
4.3 When Should a Clause be Imposed?
We now check whether it may be optimal that no non-competition clause
is imposed ex-ante even though ex-post the principal is always better o¤
retaining the agent. Note that for z = 0 we have MC = MNC as well as
bC = bNC and C = NC with s denoting the principals expected prots
8Inserting (7) into the second-order condition yields that, if there are more than one
stationary points, each of them will correspond to a local maximum. However, if there
are at least two local maxima we must have at least one local minimum which leads to a
contradiction. Hence, the local maximum described by (7) is the only one.
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Figure 1: When is a bonus paid?
contingent on the supplement s 2 fC;NCg. Expected prots are therefore
given by
(z; b) =
8><>:
(p+ A ((1  p) b+ zDA) (1  p)) (M   b)
 A ((1  p) b+ zDA) zDA
if M > M (z)
(p+ A (zDA) (1  p))M   A (zDA) zDA if M  M (z) :
(10)
with
M (z) =

zDA
1  p +
p+ A (zDA) (1  p)
A0 (zDA) (1  p)2
so that M (0)  MC and M (z)  MNC for z > 0. Comparing the principals
expected prots under a non-competition clause (s = C with z = 0) and
under no non-competition clause (s = NC with z > 0) yields the following
results:
Proposition 3 (i) If M  MNC the principal will never impose a non-
compete agreement.
14
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Figure 2: When is the clause imposed?
(ii) If M  MC a non-compete agreement will be imposed if and only if
M < zDA
1 p .
(iii) If MC < M < MNC there will be a monotonically increasing cut-o¤ func-
tion ~M (z) such that the principal will not impose a non-compete agreement
if and only if M is larger than this cut-o¤.
Proof: See Appendix.
The ndings of the proposition are illustrated in Figure 2. Note that zDA
is the expected value of the agents outside option in case of success. Hence,
the higher z the higher will be the agents expected wages (i.e. the expected
retention o¤er). The principal therefore faces the following trade-o¤: when
she does not impose the clause, expected wages increase because of a possible
outside o¤er for the agent; but the possible outside o¤er creates additional
incentives for the agent.
The region M > MNC describes a situation in which the innovation is
so valuable to the principal that she always prefers to induce both implicit
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incentives by not imposing a non-competition clause and explicit incentives
by paying an additional bonus.
Of course, the principal can create the same incentives by choosing a
non-compete agreement and a higher bonus. However, the agent free rides
on the principals success when explicit incentives are induced the agent
gets the bonus with probability p irrespective of whether he is successful
or not which increases his rent. But with implicit incentives there is no
free riding because the agent will only earn his outside option zDA if he
himself is successful. Hence, using the implicit incentives helps to reduce
the agents rent when incentives are set. Formally, the agents rent is given
by R = (p+ a (1  p)) b + azDA   c (a) with b = bNC and we have that
@R=@z < 0.9
However, if z is very large, the additional expected wage costs become
prohibitively high for the principal so that she prefers a non-compete agree-
ment and substitutes implicit incentives by higher explicit incentives.
The region M < MC =
p
A0(0)(1 p)2 describes a situation in which the
principals probability of being successful, p, is large relative to the value of
the innovation. In this case, the principal does not choose a positive bonus
neither in the case of a non-competition clause nor in the case without
such clause. It is interesting to note that in this region the clause will not be
imposed wheneverM  zDA
1 p . Even when explicit incentives are too expensive
and therefore never used by the principal, it becomes valuable to introduce
implicit incentives as long as the returns from the innovation are su¢ ciently
large relative to the expected wage costs corresponding to the agents threat
of quitting the rm after a success.
Finally, in the region MC < M < MNC again the trade-o¤ applies. If the
principals returns from the innovation, M , are large relative to the agents
outside option, zDA, the principal will not impose a non-competition clause;
otherwise, she will choose the clause.
9See Appendix.
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5 Option Contracts
So far we assumed that the principal can either impose a strict non-compete
agreement or non at all. But instead of a strict rule, the principal may well
consider including an option to impose a non-compete agreement in the con-
tract.10 If such an agreement is legal this option may be tied to a strike price
the principal has to pay to the agent ex-post when she decides to enforce
the agreement and the choice of the strike price yields an additional instru-
ment to ne-tune incentives. As has been shown for instance by Nöldeke and
Schmidt (1995, 1998) such option contracts may reduce incentive problems
when contracts are incomplete. Hence, it is interesting to study whether an
option on a non-compete agreement may be useful in our context.
To investigate this, we assume that the contract may include an option
such that the principal can decide to forbid the agent to become a competitor
at stage 5. The contract then consists of a base wage w, a bonus payment
b and a strike price  which the principal has to pay to the agent when she
executes the option.
It is straightforward that the principal will again always set w = 0. Note
that the principals loss when the agent becomes a competitor, M   DP ,
sets an upper bound for the strike price . If  > M   DP , the principal
will never execute the option. However, if  = 0 the principal will always
execute the option as this decision will be at no costs for her. Since the agent
anticipates the principals future behavior, the scenario  = 0 corresponds
to a situation in which the principal has chosen a strict non-compete clause.
For ease of notation let  =M  DP :
The agents objective function is given by
(p+ a (1  p)) b+ az   c (a)
and the principals ex-ante expected prots are
(p+ a (1  p)) (M   b)  az:
10We thank Patrick Schmitz for the suggestion to investigate the use of option contracts.
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To derive the optimal option contract, the principal chooses the bonus pay-
ment b and the strike price  in order to maximize this function taking into
account the incentive constraint, the limited liability condition requiring that
b;   0 , and the condition that   .
Solving this problem we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 4 If the principal can include an option to enforce a non-
compete clause when paying a predetermined strike price  to the agent she
will always make use of this possibility and choose a strictly positive . There
exist two cut-o¤ functions M1 (z) and M2 (z) with M1 (z) < M2 (z)
so that the following results hold:
(i) If M < M1 (z) the strike price is determined by
 =
(1  p)M
z
  A (z)
zA0 (z)
and no bonus is paid (b = 0).
(ii) If M1 (z)  M  M2 (z) the strike price is given by  =  and no
bonus is paid (b = 0).
(iii) If M > M2 (z) the strike price is  =  and in addition a strictly
positive bonus is paid, which is determined by
b =M   1
1  p

p+ A ((1  p) b+ z) (1  p)
A0 ((1  p) b+ z) (1  p) + z

:
Proof: See Appendix.
As before, the principal has two instruments to generate incentives. She
can still pay a bonus when an innovation has been made in the rm and she
can generate implicit incentives by allowing that the agent may become a
competitor. The second instrument has the advantage that the agent only
benets when he himself comes up with the innovation. Without the op-
tion to impose a non-compete agreement the second instrument had the
disadvantage that the agents threat to quit the rm can be too expensive.
The possibility of including an optional non-compete clause now gives the
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principal an additional degree of freedom to ne-tune implicit incentives. In
essence, the option acts as a bonus which will be paid only if the agent himself
is successful.11 Even though this event is unveriable, the agent anticipates
that he will receive a payment of  after coming up with an innovation if he
gets the possibility to become a competitor. Hence, the option is always a
more e¤ective instrument to set incentives than the bonus as the payment
of the strike prize is tied to an individual success by the agent rather than a
collective success of the rm. But the use of the option is limited as the strike
price cannot exceed the principals loss from competition  =M  DP .
If the value of the innovation is rather small for a given loss from competi-
tion, , the principal will only use the option to set incentives. For interme-
diate values of M she will set the strike price as high as feasible to generate
maximum implicit incentives, but still uses no bonus. IfM is very large rela-
tive to M  DP the principal prefers to set stronger than maximum implicit
incentives and o¤ers an additional bonus payment for collective success. It is
important to emphasize that, in any case, the strike price is strictly positive,
and, hence, the principal will never impose a strict non-compete agreement.
Note that option contracts are not the only feasible instrument to ne-
tune incentives. A di¤erent instrument would be to allow the agent to become
a competitor but to impose a ne F she has to pay to the principal in this
case. Renegotiations will then always lead the principal to make a retention
o¤er to the agent but the value of the o¤er depends on the initially prescribed
ne. Interestingly, such a ne leads to exactly the same outcome as the
option contract for a large parameter range. With a ne, the agent receives
a retention o¤er of DA   F when coming up with an innovation. Hence, for
F = DA  the ne contract exactly replicates the option contract. However,
the use of a ne is limited as it must be non-negative: Otherwise the agent
will leave the rm even when he made no innovation. Therefore implicit
incentives with a ne contract are limited to a maximum payment of DA in
case of an individual innovation by the agent. With an option contract, this
11Note that, in case (i), z is equal to the optimal bonus payment the principal would
choose if IA rather than maxfIA; IP g were veriable. Hence, the option contract replicates
the second best optimal contract given that an individal innovation is veriable.
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maximum payment is  =M  DP which is larger because M > DA +DP .
6 Conclusion
At rst sight, it seems rational for a principal always to introduce a non-
compete agreement into the labor contract. Such clause protects her against
the danger that the agent could leave the rm and utilize an innovation in
direct market competition against his former employer. In the given set-
ting, the principals preferences in favor of a non-compete agreement are
even reinforced by the assumption that ex-post the principal is always in-
terested in retaining the agent. Hence, if she has not chosen such a clause
ex-ante, ex-post she would pay the agent his outside option to make him
stay. But as we have shown the principal may nevertheless prefer not to im-
pose a non-competition clause. This will be the case if the principals prots
from entering the market are su¢ ciently large relative to the agents outside
option. If the principal can use an option contract for retaining the agent
at a predetermined price, she will even never impose a strict non-compete
agreement but always uses the option.
Note that the principals prots from entering the market can only be fully
realized if the agent does not leave the rm. But somewhat counterintuitively,
our ndings show that the larger these prots the less likely the principal will
commit the agent to the rm by using a non-compete agreement. However,
since ex-post the principal will always make a retention o¤er and keeps the
agent, the only aspects that play a role are the expected wage costs and the
implicit incentives generated by the agents outside option, and the latter are
more valuable if the principals prots from the innovation are higher.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3:
(i) When M  MNC we also have that M > MC as M (z) is monotonically
increasing in z. Hence, the principal pays a bonus in both cases. We can then
apply the envelope theorem to compute the rst derivative of the principals
prot function (10) with respect to z:
A0 ((1  p) b+ zDA)DA ((1  p) (M   b)  zDA)  A ((1  p) b+ zDA)DA:
This expression is strictly positive whenever
(1  p) (M   b)  zDA   A ((1  p) b+ zDA)
A0 ((1  p) b+ zDA) > 0
As we have interior solutions for the bonus payments we can substitute (7)
for b and obtain that the inequality is equivalent to
p+ A ((1  p) b+ zDA) (1  p)
A0 ((1  p) b+ zDA) (1  p)  
A ((1  p) b+ zDA)
A0 ((1  p) b+ zDA) > 0
which always holds. Hence, the principal always prefers not to impose a
clause in that case.
(ii) First note that when no bonus is paid in both settings (M  MC), the
principal would prefer to impose the clause if
(0; 0)  (z; 0),
pM  (p+ A (zDA) (1  p))M   A (zDA) zDA ,
M  zDA
1  p:
Hence, for M  MC the clause is imposed if and only if M  zDA1 p .
(iii) We still have to examine the case where MC < M < MNC . In this region,
the principal pays a bonus with a clause and no bonus without. Hence, she
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prefers not to impose the clause whenever
(p+ A (zDA) (1  p))M  A (zDA) zDA  (p+ A ((1  p) b) (1  p)) (M   b)
(11)
is strictly positive for b = bC . We now show that if this condition holds
for a certain M it will hold for any M 0 > M: This is true if the derivative
with respect toM of the left-hand side will always be larger than that of the
right-hand side. Suppose that would not be the case. Then (by applying the
envelope theorem)
p+ A (zDA) (1  p)  p+ A ((1  p) b) (1  p),
zDA  (1  p) b,
zDA  (1  p)

M   p+ A ((1  p) b) (1  p)
A0 ((1  p) b) (1  p)2

,
M  zDA
1  p +
p+ A ((1  p) b) (1  p)
A0 ((1  p) b) (1  p)2 :
But as A (:) is strictly increasing and concave, this implies
M  zDA
1  p +
p+ A (zDA) (1  p)
A0 (zDA) (1  p)2
;
which contradicts M < MNC . Hence, a cut-o¤ function ~M (z) must indeed
exist and is implicitly dened by setting (11) equal to zero. Since (11) has
continuous partial derivatives, from the implicit-function theorem ~M (z) will
also be continuous.
We know already from case (ii) that the clause is not imposed if M 
zDA
1 p for M  MC . From the paragraph before, we can conclude that for
z < (1 p)
MC
DA
the clause is neither imposed for all M  MC . Furthermore, by
continuity of the prot function ~M

(1 p) MC
DA

= MC . For z >
(1 p) MC
DA
we
obtain the slope of ~M (z) by applying the implicit function theorem and the
envelope theorem to (11):
@ ~M (z)
@ (z)
=
 A0 (zDA) (1  p)M + A0 (zDA) zDA + A (zDA)
(A (zDA)  A ((1  p) b)) (1  p) DA: (12)
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We have already shown by contradiction that zDA > (1  p) b in the relevant
area. Hence, the denominator must always be positive. The numerator of
(12) will be strictly positive, if
~M (z) <
A (zDA)
A0 (zDA) (1  p) +
zDA
1  p := M^ (z) :
Note that ~M

(1 p) MC
DA

< M^

(1 p) MC
DA

and therefore ~M (z) is strictly in-
creasing at (1 p)
MC
DA
. Now suppose that @
~M(z)
@z
 0 for some z > (1 p) MC
DA
which is equivalent to ~M (z)  M^ (z). This would require that ~M (z) inter-
sects M^ (z) from below at some point at which (by denition of M^ (z)) ~M (z)
must have a local maximum. But as M^ (z) is strictly increasing this leads to
a contradiction.
Proof of @R=@z > 0 for M > MNC:
The agents rent is given by
R = (p+ a (1  p)) b+ azDA   c (a)
= (p+ A ((1  p) b+ zDA) (1  p)) b
+A ((1  p) b+ zDA) zDA
 c (A ((1  p) b+ zDA)) :
Di¤erentiation with respect to z gives (for brevity the arguments of the func-
tions are omitted)
@R
@z
= A0  (1  p)DAb+ A0  @b
@z
(1  p)2 b+ (p+ A  (1  p)) @b
@z
+A0  zD2A + A0  (1  p)
@b
@z
zDA + A DA
 c0  A0 

(1  p) @b
@z
+DA

= (A0 (1  p) b+ A+ A0zDA   c0A0)

(1  p) @b
@z
+DA

+ p
@b
@z
=   pDA
1  p
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because of (9).
Proof of Proposition 4:
The agent chooses a = A ((1  p) b+ z). The principal therefore solves
maxb;F (p+ A ((1  p) b+ z) (1  p)) (M   b)  A ((1  p) b+ z) z
s.t. b;   0
 M  DP
The rst derivatives of the principals objective function are given by
@
@b
= (1  p) [A0 ((1  p) b+ z) ((1  p) (M   b)  z)  A ((1  p) b+ z)]  p
@
@
= z [A0 ((1  p) b+ z) ((1  p) (M   b)  z)  A ((1  p) b+ z)] :
Note that the terms in square brackets coincide in both expressions, and
therefore @
@
= z
(1 p)
 
@
@b
+ p

. A strictly positive bonus b > 0 implies that
@
@b
= 0 and in turn @
@
= pz
(1 p) > 0. Hence,  = M   DP whenever b > 0.
Furthermore,  must be strictly positive, whenever b = 0 as
@
@

=0;b=0
= z [A0 (0) (1  p)M ] > 0:
Three possible alternatives remain:
(i) b = 0;  <  requires that @
@

=;b=0
< 012 which is equivalent to
z [A0 (z) ((1  p)M   z)  A (z)] < 0,
M <
1
1  p

A (z)
A0 (z)
+ z

=:M1 (z) :
12The argument from footnotes 7 and 8 also applies here.
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The optimal strike price  is then implicitly determined by
A0 (z) ((1  p)M   z)  A (z) = 0,
 =
(1  p)M
z
  A (z)
zA0 (z)
:
(ii) b = 0;  =  requires that @
@b

=;b=0
 0 and @
@

=;b=0
 0 which is
equivalent to
(1  p) [A0 (z) ((1  p)M   z)  A (z)]  p  0 and
z [A0 (z) ((1  p)M   z)  A (z)]  0;
which is equivalent to
M  1
1  p

p+ A (z) (1  p)
A0 (z) (1  p) + z

=:M2 (z) and
M  1
1  p

A (z)
A0 (z)
+ z

:
(iii) b > 0;  =  requires that @
@b

=;b=0
> 0 or
(1  p) [A0 (z) ((1  p)M   z)  A (z)]  p > 0,
M >
1
1  p

p+ A (z) (1  p)
A0 (z) (1  p) + z

In that case the optimal bonus is determined by
A0 ((1  p) b+ z) ((1  p) (M   b)  z)  A ((1  p) b+ z) = p
1  p ,
b =M   1
1  p

p+ A ((1  p) b+ z) (1  p)
A0 ((1  p) b+ z) (1  p) + z

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